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I. Introduction
Statistical effects of changes in the number of strategic missiles
to be carried on each Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine are explored in this
study. The measures of effectiveness selected are (1) the numbers of sub-
marines and missiles in the Missile System and (2) the total cost of a
system required so that a specific number of missiles will survive an enemy
'first strike' and be available for retaliation. The required number of
submarines is determined using a simple binomial model of survival. A
basic parameter of this model is the probability P that a submarine is
neutralized (made ineffective by enemy action) in the 'first strike'.
A tentative cost estimation procedure for submarines is introduced
to illustrate the use of the model. It is demonstrated that changes in
submarine neutralization probability could be the dominating factor in
selecting submarine size. An increase in this probability with submarine
size should be anticipated since a larger submarine would be more detectable
and an enemy could be expected to increase its countermeasures against a
smaller number of larger, and hence more potentially damaging, submarines.
A statistical basis is provided for evaluation of potential changes in
submarine neutralization probability.
The U. S. Navy system of Poseidon and Trident submarines projected
for the late 1 970 ' s is also analyzed to determine neutralization probabilities
for the two submarine types which can be tolerated for selected missile
survival levels.
The model used in this study can be applied to missile systems
which are not submarine-borne. It can also be applied to fixed land-
based missile launch sites and to mobile sites such as aircraft carriers
or other specially designed land or sea-borne vehicles designed to carry
long range neuclear missiles. In comparing such systems it is convenient
to consider the neutralization probability P of a launch vehicle as the
product of a probability P
D
of detection and location of the launch
vehicle and the probability P^ of a successful attack on a launch
vehicle whose position is known. For fixed land-based sites, their
position can be considered to be known by a potential enemy so that PQ
is approximately unity. Depending upon the extent of site hardening and
attack weapon dispersion accompanied by residual uncertainty in exact
launch site location with respect to long range attack weapon positions
the factor P. can be substantially less than unity. For mobile land
or sea-surface launch vehicles P. could be near unity and P
D
will
depend on enemy surveillance levels. With overt trailing of surface ships
P
D
would be near unity. With tracking using air or satellite surveillance
it could be high but not unity. The submarine system posesses a desirable
low level for Pp even if substantial surveillance effort were attempted
by an enemy.
II. Statistical Model
Suppose that it is desired that a specified number of submarine-borne
missiles survive an enemy 'First Strike' to provide a retaliation capability.
The effect of changing the number of missiles carried by each submarine on
both the total number of submarines and the total number of missiles required
prior to the 'First Strike 1 is to be investigated.
Let
N = number of submarines available prior to enemy action,
r = number of missiles carried by each submarine,
M = Nr = number of missiles available prior to enemy action,
m = number of missiles desired for retaliation, and
k = number of submarines required for these m missiles.
It will be assumed that an unneutral ized submarine will be capable of launching
all of its missile after the 'First Strike 1 . Thus K is the smallest
integer greater than or equal to the ratio m/r . This is the number of
submarines that must survive to provide a retaliation by m missiles.
Initially, it will be assumed that P does not change with missile
loadings of the submarines. The number of submarines surviving an enemy 'First
Strike' is a random variable X which is assumed to be binomial ly distributed
with mean N(l-P) and variance NP(l-P).
The number of submarines (N) required so that the probability
that at least K submarines survive will be at some specified probability
level P^g is to be determined. Introducing a Normal approximation for
the Binomial distribution for X , this probability can be expressed as
Prob {X> N(l-P) - a/NP(l-P))= P ks
The parameter a is obtained from Normal tables. This leads to the
inequality
N(l-P) - avW(l-P) > K
which must be satisfied by selection of the number of submarines (N)
available prior to enemy action. The required number is the smallest
integer satisfying the inequality
N >
(2K+a 2 P) + /(2K+a z P) z - 4KZ
2(1-P)
The probability P. for an initial force of N submarines to
provide K surviving after enemy action can be specified as desired.
If P. = 0.5 than at least K submarines will survive in about half
of the enemy 'First Strikes'. For greater assurance of a retaliation
capability by at least K submarines, P. can be increased. With
P. = 0.9
, at least K submarines will survive in about 9 out of 10
engagements. Possible probability levels of interest are given below






These parameter values were used to construct the tables which follow
(Tables 1 - 3).
Some discussion of these tables may be useful. For P = 0.0 all
submarines survive and N = K . (This is the first row in each table.) As
P increases, N (the number of submarines initially required) increases
rapidly. For example, with P. = 0.5 and K = 50, N increases from
50 to 1000 as P increases from to 0.95. N also increases as the
probability level P. increases but at a substantially slower rate. For
K = 50 and P = .95 N increases from 1000 to 1254 as P. increases
from 0.5 to 0.95 . The increases in N required for additional con-
fidence are considerably less than those required for increased submarine
neutralization probability.
Of more specific interest in the problem of submarine loading is the
effect of changing K . Suppose it is proposed that the number of missiles
carried by each submarine be doubled. Then survival by half as many sub-
marines would provide the same number of missiles for retaliation. If
K = 100 for the smaller submarines then K = 50 would suffice for the
larger ones. At a probability level of P. =0.5 it can be seen (Table 1)
that N is half as large for K = 50 as it is for K = 100 . For higher
probability levels, however, doubling the submarine load does not permit
halving the number of submarines required unless P = . When P. = 0.95
(Table 3) and P = .95
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the ratio of the numbers of submarines of the two sizes required is
1254
2348
= 0.53 . At lower missile survival levels this ratio is larger.
?0?
With K = 10 versus K = 5 the ratio is j& = 0.61 .
Thus the ratio of submarines required is inversely proportional to the
submarine loading when either the submarine neutralization level is P =
or a low probability level (P ks = 0.5) is acceptable. When the sub-
marine neutralization is high (P = 0.95) and a reasonably high probability
level of P^ = 0.95 is desired for a substantial missile survival
level the increase in the ratio can be modest. However, for high sub-
marine neutralization probability and P. level and' a lowrequired missile
survival level, the ratio can increase substantially. In the latter
situation, the assumption that doubling the submarine loading will permit
halving the number of submarines could lead to an unacceptable retaliation
capability.
Another aspect of submarine loading becomes evident when the
total number of missiles M = Nr is considered. The effect of a reduction
in the level for P^ will be demonstrated by including submarine and
missile requirements for P^ = 0.9 as well as 0.95 . Missile
survival levels of m = 50, 100, 200 have been arbitrarily selected
to provide a range of retaliation capabilities. The required numbers
of submarines and missiles are presented in Tables 4 - 7 . It is evident
in these tables that the reduction in the number of submarines required
is accompanied by an increase in the total number of missiles required.
For example, with P. = 0.95, m = 100, and P = 0.95 the number
of submarines with r = 5 missiles each that is required (K = -f— = 20)
is 572 whereas the number of required submarines with r = 10 missiles
331
, only -rj2 = 0.58 as many submarines of theeach (K = i^ = 10) is 331
larger size are required. However, the number of missiles required in-
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The increase in missile requirements which accompanies the decrease
in submarine requirements that can be achieved by increasing submarine size
leads to introduction of total system cost to achieve m surviving missiles





where N (K) is the number of submarines carrying r missiles each that
is required for m = rK surviving missiles and C(r) is the cost of a
submarine with r missiles.
Changing the submarine loading from r to 2r will be preferred on







For a desired missile survival of m = 100, submarine loadings of r = 5
and 2r = 10 missiles can be compared. The cost of a system for K = -^- = 20
surviving submarines carrying 5 missiles each is to be compared with the
cost of a system for K/2 = -j?r = 10 submarines carrying 10 missiles
each. For a P
k




. 73 when P = 0.95
15
and
^||i = y| = 1.92 When P = 0.05
In other words, when P = 0.95 , if the cost of a 10 missile submarine
is more than 1.73 times the cost of a 5 missile submarine, then the
smaller submarine is preferred.
If the cost of missiles is a substantial portion of the total
system cost, it would be of some interest to break down the cost C(r) of
a submarine with r missiles to the cost C„(r) of the submarine alone
s










Costs for different sizes of submarines are not readilv available.
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Ballistic missile submarine cost estimate by Professor M. G. Sovereign,
Dept. OR/AS, Naval Postgraduate School
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where C (r) and C
m
= 5 are the estimated costs for the submarine and
missile, respectively in millions of dollars. This estimate is for pro-
curement costs and does not include operating costs. It will be used for
illustration purposes only. Doubling the submarine loading from r to















This inequality shows that the larger submarine will be preferred when the
savings on submarine costs are greater than the accompanying increase in
missile costs. The condition for the larger submarine to have lower system
cost can also be expressed in the form
V> < ^fW ) W - "~%mh cm
To illustrate this, let P
ks
= 0.95, m = 100, and r = 10
Submarines carrying 2r = 20 missiles each will give a lower total
system cost when
C.(20)< (^CM0)-< 40"10>C202 b s vlw; 202
< 1.638 C
s




The estimated costs C (10) = 234.5 and C $ (20)
= 260 indicate that the
20 - missile submarines would lead to lower total system costs than 10 -
missile submarines when
r
. 1.638 C.(10) - C
s (20)
m Ol =34 ' 3
If the individual missile cost were this high, then the missiles would




In the preceding sections it was assumed that the probability P
of neutralization for a submarine did not change with submarine loading.
There are two factors which suggest that P should be less for smaller
submarines. One is size, with larger submarines being easier to detect
and to either track or trail and with their larger payload making it more
important for an enemy to neutralize them. The other factor is the number
of submarines required for a specified retaliation capability which can
change an enemy's surveillance requirements and hence his resource allocation
Both of these factors need consideration.
It appears obvious that the larger a submarine is the easier it
will be to detect. As an opposing effect on P , a smaller number of
larger submarines would give each submarine more patrol area to hide in.
Of perhaps greater impact on P is the effect of the magnitude of the
payload on an enemy's surveillance effort. If submarines with very large
payloads are deployed, an enemy could be expected to expend extra effort
to neutralize them thus increasing P substantially. On the other hand,
if the number of submarines is large and single submarines do not pose a
major threat, then P could be quite small.
To illustrate this consider a desired retaliation level of 100
missiles with a probability level of P, = 0.95 where submarines with
KS
r = 10 and r = 20 missiles each are to be considered. Suppose an
enemy uses trailing and has a neutralization probability of P = 0.8
for the smaller submarines. Then the required number of 10 - missile
submarines is N = 80 carrying M = 800 missiles. It would appear ad-
19
vantageous on a cost basis to select the 20 - missile submarines since
for P = 0.8 only N = 48 submarines carrying 960 missiles would be re-
quired. The estimated costs of the two systems are
and
C(10, 10) = 80C
s
(10) + 800 Cm = 19,160
C(20, 5) = 48C
s
(20) + 960 Cm = 12,480
However, if the increased submarine size and greater enemy surveillance
effort because of their greater threat increases the neutralization pro-
bability to P = 0.9 then N = 100 of the 20 - missile submarines with
M = 2000 missiles would be required to provide the desired retaliation
capability. The cost of the sytem of larger submarines then is
C(20, 5) = 100 C
s
(20) + 2000 Cm = 36,000.
The preference is shifted to the smaller submarine.
Suppose, however, the enemy did not use trailing and that the
neutralization probability was 0.05 . Then 12 of the 10 - missile
submarines with 120 missiles or 7 of the 20 - missile submarines
with 140 missiles would suffice to provide the desired retaliation level
The two system costs are
and
C(10, 10) = 12 C(10) + 120 Cm = 3414
-A
C(20, 5) = 7 C
s
(20) + 140 Cm = 2520,
20
If P was increased to 0.1 for the larger submarines because of their
greater detectability, then 8 submarines with 160 missiles would be
required with
C(20, 5) = 8 C
s
(20) + 160 Cm = 2880
If the enemy increased its surveillance efforts for the larger submarines
so that P was raised to 0.25 , then 10 of the larger submarines with
260 missiles would be required. Then
C(20, 5) = 10 C
s
(20) + 200 Cm = 3600
The primary reason for considering this system would be the increased
enemy resource expenditure necessary to raise the submarine neutralization
probability to 0.25 .
21
V. Application
The projected U. S. Navy submarine-missile system for the late
1970
* s includes two sizes of submarines (news cl ipping, Monterey Herald, Aug. 17, 197
The current generation of Poseidon submarines with r = 16 missiles each is
to be maintained at a level of N = 31 submarines. These are to be
x
supplemented by N = 10 of the larger Trident submarines with r = 24
missiles each. For this system the model discussed in the preceding sections
must be modified to include the two submarine sizes.
Let P denote the probability that a Poseidon submarine will be
neutralized in an enemy's first strike. The number of Poseidon submarines
surviving, x , will have a binomial distribution, i.e.
,
N
Prob. (X Poseidon survivors) = ( Y
x




= P(x.;N Y ,P v )
for x = 0, 1, ..., N . The probability that y of the N Trident
x y
submarines survive when their individual neutralization probability is
P has a similar form. The joint probability that there will.be Poseidon
submarines and y Trident submarines surviving is the product













= Prob (16x + 24y;> m)
=
j; I Prob (x,y) .
x y
where the summation is over all x and y such that
16 x + 24y ;> m .
For this situation, the approach used in the preceding sections
must also be changed. There, the numbers of submarines and missiles
required for m missiles to survive with a given confidence level were
determined as a function of the submarine neutralization probability.
Here, since N and N are specified, it is more appropriate to de-
termine the probability level for m surviving missiles as a function of
P and P . A missile survival level of m = 3r = 2r = 48 was
x y x y
arbitrarily selected for illustration. The results are presented in
Table 8 . Confidence levels for m = 6r = 4r =96 surviving missiles
x y
are shown in Table 9 . Acceptable neutralization probabilities for
m = 48 (96) missile survivals with a probability level of 0.95 are sketched
in Figure 1 . It is expected that P
v
<: P
. For P = P = P the ac-
x y x y
ceptable values are approximately P = 0.77 for m = 96 and P = .85
for m = 48 .
23
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Acceptable Neutralization Probabilities for m = 48,96








x for m = 96





























































16x + 24y * m ^
= I I P(*,y)
x y
for 16x + 24y 2» m
where m is the number of surviving missiles desired
It is more convenient to calculate
x y
for 16x + 24y < m .
27




= I I P™d (x;31,Px ) Prob (y;10,Py )
for 2X + 3y £ 6
where 1-Pm „ (and hence P ) are to be calculated for values of P„ andms ms x
P in the interval (0,1) .
The nature of the calculations is shown in the accompanying sketch
with the summation including P(x,y) for all points (x,y) of integer
pairs below the line 16x + 24y < m .
28
For m = 48
1 " P
ms"













) + Prob (1;31,P
X )]




= Prob (0;10,P ) I Prob (X;31,P X ) + Prob (1;10,P) I Prob (X;31,P X )
x=0 x=0
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